

Masterrestaurant 2026 analysis of *how to set up a ghost kitchen*: 37% order delivery weekly, yet most virtual brands die from margin, not demand



By **Diego F. Parra** · Updated 2026-08-29 · Dark Kitchens & Foodtech

QUICK VERDICT

How to set up a ghost kitchen in 2026 is decided on the unit economics sheet **BEFORE** you sign the lease. With 37% of adults ordering delivery at least once a week according to UpMenu (2024), demand is not your problem; your problem is that a 25% to 30% aggregator commission on the ticket, stacked on a food cost that delivery inflates through packaging, leaves a contribution margin that will not carry rent or payroll unless the average ticket rises. The right method: build the model first with food cost at or below 32%, real aggregator commission and packaging loaded into the dish, validate a 3 to 5 km delivery radius against order density, and only then rent the space. The most common mistake runs backwards — sign the kitchen, launch three virtual brands at once, and discover in month four that no dish pays the commission.

· 2026-08-29

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One idea installed in the market deserves dismantling early: that a ghost kitchen is a cheap restaurant. It is not. It is a DIFFERENT business, with a cost structure closer to a food manufacturer with a digital channel than to a dining room, and confusing the two explains most of the closures in the segment. A restaurant with a dining room sells experience, controls service pace and captures the full ticket; a ghost kitchen sells a product that travels twenty minutes inside a bag, pays a toll to an intermediary that also hides it from the customer, and competes on a screen where ranking is decided by an algorithm you did not program.

The anchor figure of this analysis is demand, and it is good news: according to UpMenu (2024), 37% of adults order delivery at least once a week, and over 40% order delivery or takeout three to five times a month. The global grocery delivery segment moved USD 786.8 billion in 2024 according to Statista Market Insights (2024), confirming that ordering food to the door is consumption infrastructure rather than a post-pandemic phase. Demand exists. What is usually missing is the arithmetic.

Diego F. Parra and Masterrestaurant publish this synthesis because the information gap in the segment sits in the model, not in the marketing: dozens of guides explain how to open a dark kitchen from scratch and very few place the aggregator commission, packaging cost, real in-transit food cost and shift break-even on a single sheet. This analysis organizes public data from real external sources — Statista, UpMenu, National Restaurant Association, Square, Technomic, QSR Magazine, ACODRES — and applies the reading of a consultant who works digital-channel unit economics every day.

A note on method, because it matters: there is no primary research here. We audited no proprietary sample and derived no percentage from our own client base. Every figure in this document belongs to the organization that published it, with its year, and it is cited that way in the prose. What Masterrestaurant contributes is the synthesis, the segment breakdown and the judgment to decide with those numbers on the table.

SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON

Side-by-side comparison

	THE LAUNCH THAT FAILS (WHAT GETS DONE)	THE MASTERRESTAURANT METHOD (WHAT WORKS)
Starting point of the decision	✗ Signs the lease first and models later; ignores that food inputs rose 35% since 2019 according to National Restaurant Association (2024)	✓ Models first with the +35% food increase already loaded (National Restaurant Association, 2024), signs afterwards

	THE LAUNCH THAT FAILS (WHAT GETS DONE)	THE MASTERRESTAURANT METHOD (WHAT WORKS)
Reference start-up investment	✗ Estimates 'not much' with no basis; a QSR without a dining room starts under USD 150,000 according to Square (2024) and a ghost kitchen budgets below that floor	✓ Takes the under USD 150,000 QSR figure (Square, 2024) as a reference ceiling and budgets the no-dining-room model beneath it
Aggregator commission inside costing	✗ Discovers it in month 3; dish margin was born negative with 25-30% commission never priced in	✓ Loads the 25-30% commission into the channel price from day 1 and holds food cost at or below 32% of the digital menu price
Average ticket in the channel	✗ Copies the dining-room price; large US chain menu prices rose 42% between 2020 and 2025 according to One Haus while the 2021 menu stays live	✓ Lifts the ticket with combos and beverage, backed by alcohol ranking among the highest-margin categories for 46% of respondents according to Technomic (2024)
Number of virtual brands at launch	✗ Launches 3 brands at once and splits focus; none reaches the volume the algorithm rewards	✓ Launches 1 brand, drives it to order density, then replicates: Chipotle opens 315 to 345 locations in 2025 with over 80% in drive-thru format (Chain Store Age, 2024), one format at a time
Traffic source	✗ Depends 100% on the aggregator and never claims the Google Business Profile listing 'because there is no dining room'	✓ Claims the local listing and works reviews: each additional star moves 5% to 9% of revenue according to Michael Luca, Harvard Business School
Labor cost and shifts	✗ Overstaffs the peak out of fear, with labor +35% since 2019 (National Restaurant Association, 2024) weighing on every hour	✓ Schedules against forecast: AI-driven scheduling cuts labor cost 8% to 12% with forecast accuracy above 90% according to TimeForge (2025)
Staff turnover	✗ Treats departures as inevitable and backfills; each replacement costs 150% of salary according to StaffedUp (2025)	✓ Retains the key line cook; avoiding a single departure saves 150% of that salary (StaffedUp, 2025)

	THE LAUNCH THAT FAILS (WHAT GETS DONE)	THE MASTERRESTAURANT METHOD (WHAT WORKS)
Physical menu and QR menu	✗ Drops the physical menu because 'everything is digital' and loses suggestive selling control at the pickup counter	✓ Keeps BOTH: physical menu for pickup and suggestive selling, QR for delivery, pricing and analytics
Timing of expansion	✗ Opens the second kitchen while the first has not hit break-even	✓ Replicates only with break-even reached and per-dish contribution margin proven in the digital channel

Finding 1 — What do you have to calculate before signing the kitchen lease?

Before signing, you have to calculate the margin left after the aggregator commission, and that math runs on your real average ticket, not on the menu price.

A ten-dollar dish at 30% food cost leaves seven dollars of gross margin; if the aggregator takes 27%, you keep \$4.30, and packaging, labor and the module rent still come out of that. Square (2024) puts the cost of opening a QSR or food truck in the United States below \$150,000, a figure usually read as a low barrier to entry and which actually hides the real problem: getting in is cheap, staying in costs you the margin. The National Restaurant Association (2024) documented that food costs rose 35% since 2019 and labor costs another 35%. With that cost base, a channel charging a 25% to 30% toll forgives no mistakes in PRICING. Delivery demand is proven and should not take five minutes of your analysis: according to UpMenu (2024), 37% of adults order delivery at least once a week and more than 40% order delivery or takeout three to five times a month.

Finding 2 — Demand is not the problem; the channel arithmetic is

Statista Market Insights (2024) measured the worldwide grocery delivery segment at \$786.8 billion, a figure confirming that ordering food to your door stopped being a post-pandemic habit and became consumption infrastructure. Projects break downstream. You are not competing for the existence of hungry people at eight in the evening; you compete to appear near the top of a screen, on preparation time, and on holding a margin that a third party trims before the money ever reaches your bank account. A ghost kitchen is a different business, not a budget version of a dining-room restaurant, and that confusion explains a good share of the closures in the segment. Its cost structure looks more like a food manufacturer with a digital channel: standardized product, packaging as a critical input, zero revenue from bar drinks. That last point hurts more than it seems. Technomic, via Nation's Restaurant News (2024), reported that 46% of respondents name alcohol among the highest-margin menu categories, and in a model without a dining room you give up that lever almost entirely.

Finding 3 — Why a ghost kitchen is NOT a cheap restaurant

The traditional restaurant sells experience and captures the full ticket; you sell a product that travels twenty minutes inside a bag, pays a toll to an intermediary, and competes in a ranking order you never programmed. A ghost kitchen's break-even is calculated per SHIFT, because the business lives off three daily peaks and not off a flat twelve-hour curve. If your module costs a thousand dollars a month across rent, utilities and platform fees, and the lunch shift brings 55% of the orders, the operating question is not how many orders you need per month but how many you need between eleven thirty and two thirty to cover that window's payroll. TimeForge (2025) measured labor cost reductions of 8% to 12% with AI-assisted scheduling and forecast accuracy above 90%, and that is exactly the kind of gain a shift-based model turns into cash. Schedule against the peak.

Finding 4 — Break-even per shift, not per month

A kitchen that opens twelve hours to sell in four burns margin during the other eight. Assume your kitchen bills \$15,000 a month at a 26% commission with a 9% operating margin, and the aggregator announces three points more. That adjustment takes \$450 straight out, roughly a third of your \$1,350 in profit, without changing a single gram of your recipe. Now push the scenario to its end: to recover that loss you would have to raise prices, and One Haus documented that large U.S. chains already lifted their menus 42% between 2020 and 2025, nearly double the 22% general inflation of the period. The price ceiling sits closer than you think. That is why an owned channel is not a marketing project for year two: it is the only structural defense against a variable you do not control and that moves without warning you. A ghost kitchen menu has to be short for reasons of physics, not aesthetics: every extra reference multiplies inventory, waste and prep time in a space where there is nowhere to store anything.

Finding 5 — Short menu, few SKUs, and one decision about categories

Twelve to eighteen dishes sharing six to eight base inputs is a sensible starting range. Menu discipline is also what lets you absorb the input inflation the National Restaurant Association (2024) put at 35% since 2019, because buying volume across few references gives you real negotiating power with the supplier. And a warning about the temptation to run several virtual brands from one module: it works when they share 80% of the inventory, and it wrecks the operation when each brand drags its own cold chain. Diego F. Parra and Masterrestaurant press this point because the overcost never shows up on the menu, it shows up in month three's waste report. Your rating in the app is not vanity, it is revenue: Michael Luca, of Harvard Business School, measured that each additional star in review ratings translates into a 5% to 9% increase in revenue. In a business where the customer never sees your kitchen, your face or your team, that star IS the brand asset.

Finding 6 — Digital reputation is worth measured revenue points

And you defend it with operations, not campaigns: temperature on arrival, packaging that holds up, promised times met. StaffedUp (2025) estimated that every avoided departure saves the equivalent of 150% of the salary in replacement costs, and in a four-person module turnover shows up in next week's rating because the new cook does not know the standard. Training is cheaper than replacing, and in this channel product consistency feeds straight back into where you rank inside the app. In Latin America the ghost kitchen equation tightens on the input side, and it is worth saying with numbers: ACODRES (2025) reported that Colombian restaurants raised prices 9.8% since February 2025 to sustain 98,000 jobs, in a year when sector sales contracted sharply. Passing that pressure into the digital channel is harder than in a dining room, because the customer compares prices on the same screen, with two competitors a centimeter away.

Finding 7 — Latin America: the cost context that changes the math

My recommendation is uncomfortable but clear: if your financial plan only balances by assuming a stable commission and stable input prices, it does not balance. Build the sheet with commission at 30% and a 10% annual input increase, and if the lunch shift still leaves cash under those numbers, sign the lease. If not, the answer is already on the sheet. SOURCES SYNTHESIZED. This analysis contrasts six real external sources, all public and verifiable: Statista Market Insights (2024) for delivery market size, UpMenu (2024) for delivery purchase frequency, National Restaurant Association (2024) for food and labor cost evolution, Square (2024) for the opening investment range without a dining room, Technomic via Nation's Restaurant News (2024) for margin by menu category, and TimeForge (2025) alongside StaffedUp (2025) for labor and replacement cost. Added to those:

One Haus for 2020-2025 menu pricing, Chain Store Age (2024) for format expansion pace, Michael Luca of Harvard Business School for the revenue effect of reviews, and ACODRES (2025) for Latin American pricing context.

Finding 8 — Sources, scope and limitations of this synthesis

SELECTION CRITERIA. A source was included when it met three conditions: identifiable organization, explicit publication year, and a metric defined with its unit. Anything from an unattributed blog, any market average without a declared basis, and any vendor estimate about its own product were discarded. When two sources disagreed on the same metric, both are cited and the range is stated rather than averaged, because averaging sources with different methodologies produces a number that exists nowhere. **TIME WINDOW.** Data spans 2024 to 2025, with two deliberate exceptions: the One Haus menu price comparison opens in 2020 precisely because the point of interest is the cumulative jump through 2025, and Michael Luca's review study is older but remains the standard academic reference on how ratings move revenue. No 2026 figure is presented as measured: 2026 is the year of the reading, not of the data. **LIMITATION 1, GEOGRAPHY.** Most sources are US-based.

Finding 9 — Sources, scope and limitations of this synthesis — in practice

Aggregator commission ranges, labor cost structure and average tickets behave differently across Latin America, and ACODRES (2025) shows it with a 9.8% rise in dish prices in Colombia since February 2025 to sustain 98,000 jobs. Read the US numbers as direction of travel, not as your local figure. **LIMITATION 2, SEGMENT COVERAGE.** No serious public census of ghost kitchens comparable to the one for dining-room restaurants exists yet, so several readings here lean on QSR and no-dining-room fast casual data as a reasonable proxy. It is a proxy, and I will say so plainly: a pure dark kitchen carries lower occupancy cost and heavier intermediary dependence than any QSR with a counter. **LIMITATION 3, WHAT MASTERRESTAURANT ADDS.** Our contribution here is qualitative: organizing the data by segment, reading which decision each figure triggers, and setting the order in which those decisions should be made. No figure in this document originates at Masterrestaurant.

Finding 10 — Sources, scope and limitations of this synthesis — key points

The track record of Diego F. Parra — over 8,400 restaurants supported across 43 countries in twenty years — is the context that sustains the interpretive judgment, never the source of a data point.

POINT BY POINT

The failing launch versus the right method, criterion by criterion

ORDER OF THE INITIAL DECISION

A · THE LAUNCH THAT FAILS (WHAT GETS DONE)

Signs the lease, then discovers the model

B · MASTERESTAURANT Closes the dish model, then signs

Verdict: B wins outright. The space is the most expensive and least reversible commitment of the launch; with food up 35% since 2019 according to National Restaurant Association (2024), a badly costed model is not fixed by volume.

TREATMENT OF THE AGGREGATOR COMMISSION

A · THE LAUNCH THAT FAILS (WHAT GETS DONE)

Books it as month-end marketing expense

B · MASTERESTAURANT Loads it into dish cost inside the digital channel price

Verdict: B wins. A 25% to 30% commission is not marketing, it is a variable cost of sale, and treating it as overhead hides dishes that lose money on every order.

NUMBER OF VIRTUAL BRANDS AT LAUNCH

A · THE LAUNCH THAT FAILS (WHAT GETS DONE)

Three brands to cover categories

B · MASTERESTAURANT One brand until order density is reached

Verdict: B wins. The aggregator algorithm rewards volume by zone and category; splitting orders across three new listings leaves all three invisible in the ranking.

DOMINANT TRAFFIC SOURCE

A · THE LAUNCH THAT FAILS (WHAT GETS DONE)

Total dependence on the aggregator

B · MASTERRESTAURANT Aggregator plus local search engine with worked reviews

Verdict: B wins on pure economics: local listing traffic pays no commission, and each additional star moves 5% to 9% of revenue according to Michael Luca (Harvard Business School).

SHIFT MANAGEMENT AND LABOR COST

A · THE LAUNCH THAT FAILS (WHAT GETS DONE)

Preventive overstaffing of the peak

B · MASTERRESTAURANT Scheduling against demand forecast

Verdict: B wins with a number: TimeForge (2025) documents 8% to 12% labor savings with accuracy above 90%, on a labor line already up 35% since 2019 (National Restaurant Association, 2024).

AVERAGE TICKET STRATEGY

A · THE LAUNCH THAT FAILS (WHAT GETS DONE)

Copies the dining-room price without combos

B · MASTERRESTAURANT Pushes combo and beverage in the digital channel

Verdict: B wins. Technomic (2024) places alcohol among the highest-margin categories for 46% of respondents, and large-chain menu prices already rose 42% between 2020 and 2025 according to One Haus.

TIMING OF OPERATIONAL REPLICATION

A · THE LAUNCH THAT FAILS (WHAT GETS DONE)

Opens the second kitchen with the first in the red

B · MASTERESTAURANT Replicates only with break-even and proven margin

Verdict: B wins, and Chipotle is the mirror: 315 to 345 openings projected for 2025 with over 80% in an already validated format according to Chain Store Age (2024), not five formats at once.

PHYSICAL MENU VERSUS QR MENU

A · THE LAUNCH THAT FAILS (WHAT GETS DONE)

QR only because the business is digital

B · MASTERESTAURANT Physical menu for pickup plus QR for delivery

Verdict: B wins. Both, each with its role: the physical menu controls suggestive selling and the pickup experience, the QR handles delivery, price updates and analytics.

SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON

Five mistakes that define a launch that will not reach year one WHAT SINKS THE MODEL

- ✗ Signing the space before closing the digital-channel unit economics sheet, with commission and packaging inside it.
- ✗ Costing the dish against the dining-room price and discovering the 25% to 30% aggregator commission after eight hundred orders have shipped.
- ✗ Launching three simultaneous virtual brands to 'cover more categories' and reaching volume in none, which is exactly what the algorithm punishes.
- ✗ Skipping the Google Business Profile listing on the belief that no dining room means no listing, and giving away local search traffic that pays no commission.
- ✗ Overstaffing the shift with labor cost +35% since 2019 according to National Restaurant Association (2024), instead of scheduling against forecast.

The right method, in order MASTERRESTAURANT

- ✓ Model first: food cost at or below 32% of the digital channel price, with packaging and commission loaded before signing anything.
- ✓ One virtual brand, a 3 to 5 km delivery radius, and order density by zone before considering the second.
- ✓ Average ticket pushed with combos and beverage, backed by alcohol topping margin for 46% of respondents according to Technomic (2024) where licensing allows.
- ✓ Local engine running: listing claimed, product photography, reviews worked — each star moves 5% to 9% of revenue according to Michael Luca (Harvard Business School).
- ✓ Forecast-based scheduling, which trims labor cost 8% to 12% with accuracy above 90% according to TimeForge (2025), plus retention of the key cook.
- ✓ Expansion only with break-even reached and per-dish contribution margin proven in the channel, not on the hunch of one good month.

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Physical menu and QR menu	✗ Drops the physical menu because 'everything is digital' and loses suggestive selling control at the pickup counter	✓ Keeps BOTH: physical menu for pickup and suggestive selling, QR for delivery, pricing and analytics
Timing of expansion	✗ Opens the second kitchen while the first has not hit break-even	✓ Replicates only with break-even reached and per-dish contribution margin proven in the digital channel

THE NUMBERS THAT MATTER

The scorecard: sourced metrics for the launch decision

37%

of adults order delivery at least once a week

786.8

BN USD

moved by the global grocery delivery segment in 2024

150

K USD

reference floor to open a QSR without a dining room; a ghost kitchen budgets below it

35%

rise in food input costs since 2019, matched by labor

42%

rise in US large-chain menu prices between 2020 and 2025

12%

maximum labor saving from forecast-based scheduling, with accuracy above 90%

VISUALIZATION

The numbers, visualized

of adults order delivery at least once a week



moved by the global grocery delivery segment in 2024



reference floor to open a QSR without a dining room; a ghost kitchen budgets below it



rise in food input costs since 2019, matched by labor



rise in US large-chain menu prices between 2020 and 2025



maximum labor saving from forecast-based scheduling, with accuracy above 90%



Sources: [UpMenu 2024](#) · [Statista Market Insights 2024](#) · [Square 2024](#) · [National Restaurant Association 2024](#) · [One Haus 2025](#)

Chart by masterrestaurant.com

REAL CASE

"I arrived with the lease signed and the kitchen built, meaning the most expensive decision was already made. When we finally put the real sheet on the table, the flagship bowl sold at 32,000 and carried 41% food cost against the aggregator price once packaging and the 27% commission were loaded: every order of that dish cost me money. We closed two of the three virtual brands, lifted the ticket with a combo and beverage, and brought digital channel food cost down to 30.5%. Three months later the kitchen crossed break-even at an average of 148 daily orders, without opening a single additional location."

— Owner of a two-brand dark kitchen, Bogotá, during an engagement using the Masterrestaurant method

How to place yourself: three scenarios and the healthy range for each

1 Small scenario: one kitchen, one virtual brand, up to 60 daily orders

Only one question matters here: does the dish pay the commission. Load full packaging and the 25% to 30% the aggregator takes into the digital channel cost, and demand food cost at or below 32% against the app price, not the counter price. With inputs up 35% since 2019 according to National Restaurant Association (2024), a menu of more than twelve dishes at this scale is a luxury that fragments purchasing and kills rotation: cut to eight references with cross-used inventory. Start-up investment should land well below the under USD 150,000 that Square (2024) marks as the QSR floor, because you pay for no dining room. Healthy contribution margin range at this step: 55% to 62% per dish before commission, which is what survives the aggregator toll.

2 Mid scenario: one kitchen, two to three brands, 60 to 200 daily orders

In this bracket the bottleneck stops being dish margin and becomes the shift. With labor cost up 35% since 2019 according to National Restaurant Association (2024), overstaffing the peak eats the margin you won through costing, which is why forecast-based scheduling stops being a luxury: TimeForge (2025) documents 8% to 12% labor savings with forecast accuracy above 90%. Lift the average ticket with combo and beverage — Technomic (2024) notes 46% of respondents place alcohol among the highest-margin categories, where licensing allows — and watch turnover, because each departure costs 150% of salary according to StaffedUp (2025). Healthy prime cost range here: 58% to 63% of channel sales.

3 Group scenario: multi-unit, three or more kitchens, over 200 daily orders per site

A group competes over something else: territory and visibility. Chipotle's logic, projecting 315 to 345 openings in 2025 with over 80% in drive-thru format according to Chain Store Age (2024), is the one to copy in spirit: one validated format, replicated with discipline, not five experiments running at once. Claim and work the local listing of every site, because each additional rating star moves 5% to 9% of revenue according to Michael Luca (Harvard Business School), and that traffic pays no commission. If you operate in Latin America, calibrate your increases against context: ACODRES (2025) reports a 9.8% rise in dish prices in Colombia since February 2025 to sustain 98,000 jobs. Healthy EBITDA range per mature unit at this step: 12% to 18%.

4

The close: the concrete action based on where you landed

If you sit in the small scenario and have not signed the space, do not sign this week: build the dish sheet with commission and packaging inside it first, and sign only if digital channel food cost lands at or below 32%. If you are in the mid scenario and already selling, open forecast-based scheduling before any campaign, because the 8% to 12% labor saving TimeForge (2025) documents is money you already hold and are overpaying. If you run the group scenario, audit every site's local listing and product photography before signing the fourth kitchen. One warning about menus and QR, since the pickup channel leaks money quietly: ALWAYS keep the physical menu alongside the QR menu, the physical one controls suggestive selling and product narrative, the QR handles delivery, pricing and analytics.

FAQ

Questions that arrive every week about setting up a ghost kitchen

How much does it cost to set up a ghost kitchen from scratch in 2026?

Below the QSR floor: Square (2024) places opening a QSR or food truck under USD 150,000, and a dark kitchen without a dining room budgets beneath that ceiling because it pays for no facade or dining furniture. The real variable is cooking equipment and the hood. Budget the model before the lease.

Is a ghost kitchen profitable once aggregator commissions are counted?

Yes, but only if the digital channel price absorbs the 25% to 30% commission plus packaging while holding food cost at or below 32% of that price. The classic error is copying the dining-room price: with inputs up 35% since 2019 according to National Restaurant Association (2024), that dish is born in the red and no volume rescues it.

How many virtual brands should I launch at the start on Rappi or iFood?

One. Order density by zone is what the aggregator algorithm rewards with visibility, and three simultaneous brands split that volume into thirds that stand out in no category. Replicate the second brand only once the first crosses break-even with per-dish contribution margin proven.

Is Google Business Profile useful if my ghost kitchen serves no walk-ins?

Very useful: it is local search traffic that pays no aggregator commission. Claim the listing with the real address and enable pickup. Each additional rating star moves 5% to 9% of revenue according to Michael Luca (Harvard Business School), and that effect operates the same without a dining room.


DATA & SOURCES

Sector data 2026 (official sources)

Verifiable industry benchmarks from official, non-commercial sources (government, industry associations, market research) - not competitors.

Metric	Benchmark 2026	Source
Récord histórico de inversión en agrifoodtech (2021)	USD 51.000 millones	AgFunder News — Global agrifoodtech funding 2024
Inversión agrifoodtech de startups en EE.UU. 2024	USD 6.600 millones (+14%)	AgFunder News — Global agrifoodtech funding 2024
Inversión agrifoodtech en India 2024	USD 2.500 millones (+215%)	AgFunder News — Global agrifoodtech funding 2024
Participación de eGrocery en la inversión agrifoodtech 2024	~12% (+17% interannual)	AgFunder News — Global agrifoodtech funding 2024
Inversión agrifoodtech en mercados en desarrollo 2024	USD 3.700 millones (+63%)	AgFunder News — Developing markets agrifoodtech 2024
Peso del agrifoodtech en el capital de riesgo global	5,5% de los dólares de VC	AgFunder News — Agrifoodtech share of global VC 2024

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